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Introduction
Most of the Constitution's language is so general, vague, and
comprehensive that the document can be read to bear almost any
meaning that the interpreter imputes to it. Hence, whether and to
what extent the Constitution constrains government and protects the
individual depends to a very large degree on who is interpreting what
provision and when.
The commentators are hopelessly divided in their attempts to
address this problem. At one extreme, the originalists would con-
strain constitutional interpretation by binding the interpreter to some
combination of the text and the general intentions and values of
those who framed it. Aside from its impossible indeterminacy, this
* The author received his A.B. in Philosophy and Literature, as well as his Juris Doctor-
ate, from the University of Southern California. He is a former law clerk to the Honorable
Samuel Conti, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, and is
presently associated with the law firm of Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati in Palo Alto,
California.
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theory renders the Constitution incapable of explaining very much in
a modern context, and hence makes it of little use as a Rule.' At the
other extreme, some of the non-originalists seek to constrain inter-
pretation by appeal to such extra-constitutional sources as "funda-
mental values." The problem with this view is that it universalizes
the text to such a broad and indeterminate extent that almost any
individual value held by the interpreter can then be reinstantiated in
place of the text when a given case is decided. To reduce the prob-
lem to logic, this is tantamount to moving invalidly from the state-
ment that "certain basic values are embodied in the Constitution,"
to the universal proposition that "all basic values are embodied in
the Constitution," so that the otherwise valid instantiation of the
statement, "therefore, basic value 'D' is implicit in the Constitution"
can then be made.2 If arguments were permitted to be constructed in
1. The limitations of a strict interpretivist theory are well illustrated by Professor
Tushnet's rejoinder to the argument that interpretivism guards against judicial tyranny. The
interpretivist argument is that the risk of legislative tyranny is significantly outweighed by the
risk of judicial tyranny that would arise if judges were not bound to the text of the Constitu-
tion. Professor Tushnet responds as follows:
This [argument] is, I think, fairly powerful. But it rests in part on an em-
pirical claim about novelty, a claim that is open to obvious external attacks.
First, the possibilities of innovative legislative tyranny are in fact great because
the social and material world in which we live has changed drastically since
1789. Wiretapping provides a standard example of innovation that interpretivism
can accommodate only with great difficulty. The drafters of the fourth amend-
ment obviously could not have contemplated wiretapping when they thought
about searches. Yet if interpretivism means that we cannot respond to that kind
of innovation, it fails to guard against legislative tyranny. Wiretapping is thus a
prime illustration for the claim that, because of the broader scope of legislative
action, the domain of innovation in legislative tyranny is more extensive than
that in judicial tyranny.
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Princi-
ples, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781, 787-88 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
In short, the criticism is that since the legislature is not bound by the text, it can create
limitless forms of tyranny (e.g., wiretapping), to which the judiciary, since it is bound to the
text on the interpretivist view, will not be able to respond. On a strict interpretivist view, the
Constitution simply cannot deal with such modern phenomena as wiretapping.
2. The proposition would be formally expressed thus:
(Ga, Gb, Gc) (x) (Gx) (invalid)
.*.(x) Gx G(d) ("valid")
Let a, b, and c all be basic values which everyone would concede are derivable from the text of
the Constitution (e.g., freedom from tyranny). If we then substitute "G" for the predicate "is
embodied in the Constitution," and let the variable "x" range over all "basic values," the
argument would then proceed (invalidly) from the statement that "Basic values a, b, and c are
embodied in the Constitution" to the conclusion that "Therefore, all basic values are embodied
in the Constitution." Having thus invalidly "derived" the latter universal proposition, we could
now validly instantiate anything that could be called a "basic value." Thus we could say that
such values as freedom from fanaticism, compassion, respect for authority, or motherhood, for
that matter, are all "basic values" embodied in the Constitution.
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this way, virtually any statement could be "derived" from any text.
Thus, the apparent dilemma of constitutional interpretation
emerges: by insisting on a too-strict adherence to the text, we derive
a theory which is incapable of explaining all that it will properly be
called upon to explain, but by going outside of the text we invite the
construction of theories which can prove far more than the document
warrants.
Among the more promising attempts to shoot between the horns
of this dilemma are the so-called "general/particular" theories and
the closely related "concept/conception" theory of interpretation.
Central to this group of theories is the hypothesis that when the
Framers drafted the Constitution, they were not merely enacting the
particularized provisions which appear in the text, such as "freedom
of speech," and "equal protection," but rather were enacting a sin-
gle, overarching moral or political philosophy, of which the textual
provisions are but instances.
The two most serious criticisms of these theories' may be sum-
marized as follows. First, it is argued that the theories reintroduce
the very value-injection they seek to avoid at two points in the inter-
pretive process: in the selection of "particulars" from which the gen-
eral theory is to be derived,4 and in the selection of the level of gen-
erality at which the concept or theory so derived is stated. The
second criticism is that even if the possibility of value-neutrality in
the interpretative process is conceded, it is still not the case that any
one general theory can be uniquely derived from any given set of
particulars or instances. Thus, it is argued, since any number of the-
ories may be generated from, and be equally consistent with, the
same set of particulars and yet yield different results for future
cases, all such theories are underdeterminative, and cannot claim to
be derived from the text.e
It will be the object of this paper to attempt to meet these criti-
cisms by appealing to a theory of knowledge as opposed to a theory
of "meaning." Specifically, my thesis is that constitutional interpre-
3. To the extent that Tushnet's criticism of the concept/conception theory (no evidence
that Framers knew they were enacting provisions that embodied a moral content richer than
their own moral conceptions) and Schauer's criticism of the general/particular theory (since
text does not determine the choice among theories equally consistent with it, no such theories
can claim to be generated by the text) are directed at the authoritativeness claims of the
respective theories, the author does not take issue with them. For full statements of these
criticisms, see Tushnet, supra note 1, at 791, and Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Lan-
guage, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 797, 816-18 (1982).
4. Schauer, supra note 3, at 818-19.
5. Tushnet, supra note I, at 791.
6. Schauer, supra note 3, at 816-18.
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tation, like the construction of scientific theory, may be most effec-
tively constrained, and personal value-injection avoided, by imposing
upon the interpreter a set of rules which requires him to accommo-
date as much knowledge as is at his disposal in a way that will pro-
duce a theory which is at once optimally modest and descriptive. In
other words, a theory is sought that neither asserts more nor de-
scribes less than the available data, including the text, warrants.
In attempting to construct a model for such interpretation, I
have turned to the epistemology of W.V. Quine, which is principally
directed at responsible belief-formation in the context of interpreting
scientific data.
The paper will proceed in three parts. In Part I, the need for a
theory of knowledge in constitutional interpretation is identified.
Part II consists of a general description of the five major points of
Quine's theory, with references, where applicable, to pertinent con-
stitutional cases and literature. In Part III, the theories and criti-
cisms noted above will be reconsidered, and an attempt will be made
to answer the latter in light of Quine's observations.
I. The Need for a Theory of Knowledge
Before discussing Quine's epistemology, it will be necessary to
indicate briefly the precise function a theory of knowledge should be
expected to perform in a model of constitutional interpretation.
In his article, "Objectivity and Interpretation, ' 7 Owen Fiss
notes that absolute objectivity is more than can be expected from
any interpretive activity, be it constitutional lawmaking or scientific
observation of the physical world. He insists, rather, that what he
calls "bounded objectivity" is the only kind of objectivity we can
hope for. 8 Bounded objectivity, Fiss argues, is achieved by imposing
upon the interpretive process what he calls disciplining rules9 which
are recognized as authoritative by an interpretive community. These
rules, Fiss concludes, simultaneously constrain the interpreter and
accommodate creativity by allowing the interpreter to interact with
the text and build bridges between it and man's other intellectual
endeavors in the humanities. It is from this interaction between the
text and our fund of knowledge in other disciplines at any given time
7. 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982).
8. "To insist on more, to search for the brooding omnipresence in the sky, is to create a
false issue." Id. at 745-46 (footnote omitted).
9. An example of a disciplinary rule is one which requires the decisionmaker to look to
history or some other area of social or moral knowledge external to the document.
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that meaning is derived.10
10. In responding to the argument, which Fiss calls the "new nihilism," that the general-
ity and comprehensiveness of the text render objective interpretation (and hence, legitimate
constitutional adjudication) impossible, Fiss states:
In coming to terms with this nihilism, one must begin by acknowledging the
generality and comprehensiveness of the constitutional text and also by insisting
that in this regard the Constitution is no different from a poem or any legal
instrument. Generality and comprehensiveness are features of any text. Though
the Constitution may be more general and comprehend more than a sonnet or a
contract, it is comparable in this regard to an epic poem or some national stat-
utes. Few, if any, statutes touch as many activities as the Constitution itself
(which, after all, establishes the machinery of government) but many, if not
most, embody conflicting values and are in that sense comprehensive. It should
also be understood that generality and comprehensiveness do not discourage
interpretation but are the very qualities that usually provoke it. Interpretation
is a process of generating meaning, and one important (and very common) way
of both understanding and expressing the meaning of a text is to render it spe-
cific and concrete.
There are some legal theorists who would limit legal interpretation to highly
specific constitutional clauses. This school, misleadingly called "interpretivism,"
but more properly called "textual determinism," operates with a most arid and
artificial conception of interpretation. For an interpretivist only a specific text
can be interpreted. Interpretation is thus confused with execution - the applica-
tion of a determinate meaning to a situation - and is unproblematic only with
regard to clauses like that requiring the President to be at least 35 years old.
Most interpretivists, including Justice Black, would recognize the narrowness of
such a perspective and want to acknowledge a role for less specific clauses, like
freedom of speech; but in truth such provisions are hardly obvious in their mean-
ing and require substantial judicial interpretation to be given their proper effect.
Does "speech" embrace movies, flags, picketing, and campaign expenditures?
What is meant by "freedom?" Does it, as Isaiah Berlin wondered, pertain exclu-
sively to the absence of restraint, or does it also embrace an affirmative capacity
for self-realization?
To endorse active judicial interpretation of specific clauses and to caution
against judicial interpretation of the more general and potentially more far-
reaching clauses, such as due process and equal protection, represents an at-
tempt at line-drawing that cannot itself be textually justified. It is instead moti-
vated by a desire - resting on the most questionable of premises - to limit the
role of constitutional values in American government and the role of the judici-
ary in expressing those values. And the line itself would be illogical. It would
require that small effect be given to the comprehensive constitutional protections
while full effect is given to the narrow ones. I reject this attempt at line-drawing
because I reject the premises and the result, but it must be emphasized that...
the critical question is not whether judicial interpretation of specific clauses,
understood in any realistic sense, is legitimate and that of general clauses is
not, since, as we saw in the case of the first amendment, both require substan-
tial interpretation. Rather, the question is whether any judicial interpretation
can achieve the measure of objectivity required by the idea of law.
Id. at 742-44 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
While Fiss thus satisfactorily demonstrates that meaning cannot be derived without inter-
pretation, he seems to tacitly concede the "nihilists' " point that the kind of objectivity which
is necessary to legitimate constitutional interpretation is impossible. This is so because while
the disciplining rules he suggests provide some outside constraints sufficient to preclude sheer
judicial fiat, they do not confer any guarantee against result-oriented interpretation, even if
full compliance with them is assumed. It is entirely possible, for example, for a judge to claim
to be (and even believe himself to be) guided by stare decisis, or history, or rules of construc-
tion, or indeed any convention one cares to name, and yet in reality to be entirely governed by
his own predispositions about what is "just" or "right." In short, while the rules require inter-
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Fiss' model, like the general/particular group of theories, ap-
pears to provide a promising middle-ground between the limitations
of the originalist theories and the potential excesses of the basic
value theories. It stops short, however, of providing any kind of "pro-
cedural" framework to assure responsible hypothesis or belief-forma-
tion within the theory, for the disciplining rules themselves neither
guard against result-oriented interpretation nor assure that whatever
theory the interpreter ultimately generates will excel rival theories
which could be generated from the same data. These criticisms, of
course, are the same which were noted above in connection with the
"general/particular" group of theories, and which indeed apply with
equal force to any non-interpretivist model. Hence, the need for a
theory of knowledge or, more precisely, of belief-formation, to pro-
vide the requisite "procedural" framework is evident.
II. Quine's Epistemology
Quine's epistemology stems from the recognition that absolute
demonstrability of anything that we commonly count as knowledge is
impossible. The soundness of this premise is indicated by the fact
that neither of the two means by which we claim to obtain knowl-
edge, deduction from self-evident truths and enumerative induction,
are sufficient conditions for proving the truth of any given proposi-
tion. Deduction from self-evident truths is insufficient simply because
the set of such truths is now recognized to be confined to the laws of
logic and mathematics - and only part of mathematics at that."
That absolute demonstrability of all logical and some mathematical
truths is possible is cold comfort, since such truths will not take us
very far in trying to explain natural phenomena or predict future
action with external sources, they do nothing to ensure that the interaction itself will be an
objective intellectual process.
11. It was once held to be a self-evident truth of set theory, for example, that a set could
be specified for any conceivable condition, until Bertrand Russell demonstrated that it was
impossible to designate a set whose members were all sets which satisfied the condition of non-
self-membership. (The set of all prime numbers, not being itself a prime number, is an exam-
ple of a set that satisfies this condition, as is almost any set which can be conceived of. The set
of sets, being a member of itself, would not satisfy the condition.)
Assuming that we designated such a set, there are only two possibilities with regard to its
self-membership: that it is a member of itself and that it is not. If it is a member of itself,
however, it cannot be a member of itself, since the condition for membership in it is that it be
a set which is not a member of itself. If on the other hand it is not a member of itself, then it
is a member of itself, since it would then satisfy the condition, but in so doing it would destroy
the set. Thus, the very designation of the set simultaneously satisfies and violates the condition.
The set of all sets which are not members of themselves cannot be designated. Hence, far from
being a self-evident truth, the proposition that a set can be designated for any condition is
simply false.
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occurrences thereof. As to enumerative induction, while repeated ob-
servation has long been deemed a necessary condition of proof,12 it
has never been held that the observation of 100 white swans licenses
the conclusion that the 101st swan observed will likewise be white.
Since it is thus evident that deduction and observation cannot
even together provide adequate means of arriving at knowledge (or
even reasonable belief), Quine submits that we must resort to hy-
pothesis"8 to make up the shortfall.
While hypothesis is by definition guesswork, Quine notes that it
can nonetheless be enlightened guesswork. To the extent it is so en-
lightened, the beliefs we form from it may be counted as reasonable
beliefs. Hence, in order to determine the reasonableness of any belief
or interpretation of data, we must have a means of objectively evalu-
ating the hypothesis or hypotheses that led to its formation. To this
end, Quine, in his book The Web of Belief,' lists five criteria, or
"virtues," which any given hypothesis may enjoy in varying degrees;
conservatism (of prior beliefs), simplicity, modesty, generality, and
refutability. These will now be considered.
A. Conservatism
The virtue of conservatism plays a paramount role in Quine's
epistemology. Because of its centrality to the arguments that follow,
it is crucial to note at the outset that Quine's use of the term refers
12. Although it is noted that such rationalist philosophers as Plato, St. Augustine, and
Descartes argued convincingly that but for our intellectual limitations, we could, at least in
theory, discover truth by pure unaided reason, i.e., without resort to experience. The rational-
ists' arguments are far from unsalvageable, logical positivism notwithstanding, but that is a
subject for another paper.
13. Quine gives a fresh definition of hypothesis which bears quotation:
Calling a belief a hypothesis says nothing as to what the belief is about,
how firmly it is held, or how well founded it is. Calling it a hypothesis suggests
rather what sort of reason we have for adopting or entertaining it. People adopt
or entertain a hypothesis because it would explain, if it were true, some things
that they already believe. Its evidence is seen in its consequences ....
Hypothesis, where successful, is a two-way street, extending back to explain
the past and forward to predict the future. What we try to do in framing hy-
potheses is to explain some otherwise unexplained happenings by inventing a
plausible story, a plausible description or history of relevant portions of the
world. What counts in favor of a hypothesis is a question not to be lightly
answered.
W.V. QUINE & J.S. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF 66 (2d ed. 1978) (emphasis added) [herein-
after QuiNE]. As the underscored phrases indicate, the formation or adoption of a hypothesis
is for Quine a very non-committal move in theory-formation. Even the most sophisticated and
fully developed hypotheses are to be regarded only as bridges to a tentative sort of knowledge,
or quasi-knowledge; they are at any time subject to major renovation or, in extreme cases,
abandonment, upon the receipt of evidence that they fail to predict or explain.
14. QUINE, supra note 13.
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strictly to a neutral principle of epistemology, and is not to be con-
flated with the term's common dictionary denotation of "resistant to
change." That the two meanings are in fact at odds with each other
will become clear when conservatism's corollary, the virtue of gener-
ality, is considered below.
Conservatism comes into play when an event occurs whose ex-
planation requires a hypothesis that conflicts with one or more of our
prior beliefs. Many events are explainable by hypotheses which are
entirely consistent with our prior beliefs (e.g., the steam has stopped
rising from my coffee, so the coffee must be cold). Those events
which give rise to our more interesting and descriptive hypotheses,
however, often conflict with such prior beliefs.
For example, the observation by nineteenth-century scientists
that Uranus was orbiting at more than two minutes out of its calcu-
lated arc gave rise to two possible hypotheses, both of which con-
flicted with prior beliefs: that Uranus was a "renegade" planet which
defied the laws of celestial mechanics, or that there was an eighth
planet, hitherto unknown and as yet unobserved, which was exerting
gravitational force on Uranus. When the virtue of conservatism is
brought to bear on such a problem, it will favor that hypothesis
which requires the least rejection of prior beliefs. In the Uranus
case, the hypothesis that the solar system included an eighth planet,
Neptune, in addition to the seven it had traditionally been believed
to contain, was properly favored over the hypothesis that the estab-
lished laws of celestial mechanics were entirely wrong. Thus, accom-
modation of the new knowledge (Uranus's aberrant orbital arc) was
accomplished with the least possible damage to our total repertoire,
or "web," of beliefs. Moreover, the fact that the scientists may have
been wrong (or underdeterminative) in their conservative choice of
hypothesis counts for, not against, their decision. As Quine notes, the
reason that conservatism is sound strategy is that
[A]t each step it sacrifices as little as possible of the evidential
support, whatever that may have been, that our overall system
of beliefs has hitherto been enjoying. The truth may indeed be
radically remote from our present system of beliefs, so that we
may need a long series of conservative steps to attain what
might have been attained in one rash leap. The longer the leap,
however, the more serious the angular error in direction. For a
leap in the dark the likelihood of a happy landing is severely
limited. Conservatism holds out the advantages of limited liabil-
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
ity and a maximum of live options for the next move.1 5
That Quine's principle of conservatism can serve as well in en-
suring responsible hypothesis in constitutional interpretation as it
does in the construction of scientific theory may be illustrated by
considering the history of the eleventh amendment. The eleventh
amendment by its terms bars only federal suits brought against
states by citizens of other states. Notwithstanding the amendment's
unequivocal language to this effect, the Supreme Court in Hans v.
Louisiana6 held that the states' sovereign immunity extended also to
federal suits brought against them by their own citizens. This deci-
sion gave rise to several possible hypotheses, two of which are consid-
ered here.
One hypothesis regarded the Hans decision as an extension of
the eleventh amendment, so that the amendment was to be construed
as a constitutional bar on all suits brought against states in federal
courts. This hypothesis was highly unconservative in that it entailed
a direct contradiction of the explicit language of the eleventh amend-
ment. Nonetheless, a majority of the Supreme Court adopted it, with
the consequence of later having to indulge in two legal fictions and
one logical contradiction in order to maintain it.
15. Id. at 67-68 (emphasis added). The notion that conservatism and its corollary, gen-
erality, are necessary attributes of responsible theory-formation, did not, of course, originate
with Quine. Nor is it new to the law. In discussing the reqvirements of principled explanation,
Professor Perry states:
Contrary to the claim of others, the requirement of principled explanation is not
inconsistent with the common-law method of developing constitutional doctrine
incrementally and even tentatively. Addressing the problem of "how the court's
reasons must 'indicate to us how future cases are to be decided,'" Wechsler
says:
[T]he court decides the case at hand and not the cases that have not arisen
. . . .But it is one thing to anticipate such future cases that perhaps may be
distinguishable, without deciding the sufficiency of the distinction [the conserva-
tism consideration]. It is quite another thing to judge the instant case in terms
that are quite plainly unacceptable in light of other cases that it is now clear are
covered by the principle affirmed in reaching judgment and indistinguishable on
valid grounds [the generality consideration] . . . . [T]he principle of the deci-
sion must be viable in reference to applications that are now foreseeable; and
that viability implies a similar decision or the existence of a possibly accept-
able distinction. Nothing less will satisfy the elements of generality and of neu-
trality implicit in the concept of a legal judgment as distinguished from the fiat
of a court.
M.J. PERRY. THE CONSTITUTION. THE COURTS. AND HUMAN RIGHTS 27 (1982) (emphasis
added) (quoting Wechsler, The Nature of Judicial Reasoning in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 297-
98 (S. Hooked 1964)). In essence, Professor Wechsler's point is the same as Quine's: that
principled theory-formation requires that hypotheses and prior beliefs (including legal doc-
trines) are to be sacrificed precisely (no more and no less) to the extent required to accommo-
date new data or foreseeable cases with indistinguishable facts.
16. 134 U.S. I (1890).
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The first legal fiction was created in Ex Parte Young," which
held that when a state acted in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the action was deemed to be not that of the state, but rather
of the officer through whom the state acted, so that relief could be
sought against the officer without violating the eleventh amend-
ment's "absolute bar" of suits against the state. The second fiction
was created in Edelman v. Jordan,'8 which held that when a suit
brought against a state officer under Young sought monetary com-
pensation, instead of mere injunctive relief, the suit was deemed to
be "in reality" against the state, and hence barred by the eleventh
amendment. Thus, under these fictions, state action in violation of
the fourteenth amendment is transformed into non-state action when
the state's agent, instead of the state, is named as defendant, but is
transformed back into state action as soon as monetary compensa-
tion is sought, so that sovereign immunity can then be invoked under
the eleventh amendment.
The logical contradiction the hypothesis entails stems from its
construction of the eleventh amendment as a constitutional bar on
all suits brought against the states in federal courts. If the eleventh
amendment were such a constitutional bar, Congress could not over-
ride it with legislation authorizing suits against states (with the ar-
guable exception of legislation enacted pursuant to section five of the
fourteenth amendment),' 9 since such an override would constitute an
addition to the federal courts' Article III subject matter jurisdiction
in violation of Marbury v. Madison.2 0 In spite of this fact, the Su-
preme Court repeatedly sanctions such overriding legislation."' But
17. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
18. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
19. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, an eleventh amendment challenge to the 1972 amendments
to the employment discrimination provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV)), the Court held that even damage suits against states were
permissible, notwithstanding the eleventh amendment, where they are authorized by legislation
enacted pursuant to Congress' power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court's rationale was that "[a]s ratified by the States after the Civil War, [the Fourteenth]
Amendment quite clearly contemplates limitations on their authority." 427 U.S. 445, 453
(1976). See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (award of attorney's fees pursuant to
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 ed.)) upheld, not-
withstanding that award would be paid out of state funds).
20. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 173-179 (1803).
21. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (Federal Employer's
Liability Act held to authorize suits against state as operator of interstate railroad); Jennings
v. Illinois Office of Educ., 589 F.2d 935 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979) (Con-
gress' authorization of suits against state under Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act (38
U.S.C. §§ 2021 et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV)) upheld as valid exercise of its war powers
under Article I of the Constitution). Accord, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit. Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985) (five to four decision) (Fair Labor Standards Act held to apply to em-
ployees of municipal mass transit authority, overruling National League of Cities v. Usery,
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in order to do so, it must at least tacitly maintain two contrary pro-
positions at the same time: that the eleventh amendment is a consti-
tutional limitation on federal subject matter jurisdiction and that it
is not.
A second hypothesis, attributable to Justice Brennan, is much
more conservative, and as a result suffers none of the illogical conse-
quences of the first. That hypothesis regards the Hans decision not
as an extension of the eleventh amendment to suits brought against
states by their own citizens, but rather as merely a reaffirmation of
the states' common-law sovereign immunity. As Professor Redish
explains:
Brennan ...identifies two sources of sovereign immunity: the
bar of the eleventh amendment against suits brought by out-of-
staters and the common-law bar against suits by in-state citi-
zens. The significant difference between the two, he argues, is
that unlike the Constitutional type of immunity, the common-
law form of sovereign immunity was waived by the states at the
time of the Constitution's ratification to the extent that Con-
gress was given power to legislate under its enumerated powers
in Article I. Thus, if Congress, in the exercise of one of its pow-
ers, renders the state subject to suit by in-state citizens, the
common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity does not act as a
bar.
22
Because Justice Brennan's hypothesis conflicts with no prior be-
liefs, and gives full effect to all and only that language which is actu-
ally set forth in the eleventh amendment, it furnishes a paradigm
example of an optimally conservative and descriptive move. Since it
allows for federal suits against states by their own citizens, pursuant
either to their consent or to a Congressional override of their com-
mon-law sovereign immunity, it achieves substantially the same re-
sult as the first hypothesis, with one important difference: it involves
no contradiction. Not having denied the plain meaning of the elev-
enth amendment to begin with, Brennan's theory enjoys the benefit
of remaining consistent with whatever other beliefs or textual provi-
sions are bound up with, or are dependent upon, that plain meaning.
In Quine's words, Brennan's theory enjoys the advantages of "lim-
ited liability and a maximum of live options for the next move. ' 23
In contrast, the first hypothesis, having once denied the eleventh
426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
22. M. REDISH. FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER 141-42 (1980) (footnote omitted).
23. QUINE, supra note 13, at 68.
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amendment its plain meaning, must resort to further contradiction in
order to justify its first, unconservative move. It is rather like lying.
Just as one fabrication begets another, so one unwarranted tear in
our web of belief (i.e., one unnecessary sacrifice of an important
prior belief) requires the adjustment of all affected strands. The
more unwarranted or unconservative the tear in the web, the more
radical is the adjustment of strands required, and the more room for
error in the resulting theory.
It is important to recognize at this point that the transferability
of Quine's theory from philosophy of science to constitutional inter-
pretation is not a mere accident or coincidence, dependent upon
choice of example. Like Newton's laws of celestial mechanics, or in-
deed any theory or "law" in any discipline, constitutional provisions
and doctrines both imply, and are implied by, a vast concatenation
of observations, beliefs, and data (including past and future cases).
Because this concatenation, or, to use Quine's metaphor, web, is the
sole means by which we are able, at any given moment (the web is
constantly changing) to consistently explain the past and predict the
future, it is not to be altered, much less overhauled, without justifica-
tion which is commensurate with the extent of the proposed altera-
tion. Such justification is to be found, if at all, where data presents
itself for the first time. In science, this occurs when new phenomena
are observed; in law, when new cases with peculiar facts arise, or
when old cases require reconsideration in light of new knowledge. In
each case, we try to frame a hypothesis which can reconcile the new
data with our entire repertoire of prior beliefs. If we are able to
frame a hypothesis that sacrifices no prior beliefs, such as Justice
Brennan's theory in the foregoing example, so much the better - a
more conservative hypothesis cannot exist. When one or more beliefs
must go, however, in order to accommodate the new data, as in the
Neptune example above, conservatism can only tell us to sacrifice as
few prior beliefs as possible. For further guidance, one must look to
the remaining virtues.
B. Simplicity
The initial appeal of a simple hypothesis is plausibility. Some-
how, the fewer the exceptions, qualifications, exceptions to excep-
tions, caveats, fictions and the like that are contained in a hypothe-
sis, the more plausible it is. Quine illustrates this point by
considering the practice of plotting measurements on a graph in at-
tempting to frame hypotheses to explain or predict them. No matter
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what pattern of distribution the points that we plot take on, there
will be infinitely many curves that can be drawn through all of the
points. Of that infinite number of curves, however, we will always
select the simplest which passes through, or reasonably close to, all
of the points. Consider, for example, the following two figures, each





Figure 1: The boiling point of water increases proportionately with
air pressure.
R2  F -= G (M1 M2 )/ R
2
10
G (M1 M2) 10
Figure 2: Any particle of matter in the universe attracts any other
with a force (F) which varies directly as the product of the masses
(G (M I M2 )) and inversely as the square of the distance between
them (R). Thus, F = G (M1 M2 )/R 2. (Newton's law of universal
gravitation.)
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The benefit that simplicity confers on a hypothesis is that it en-
ables the hypothesis to explain many diverse phenomena in a brief,
unified, elegant account, as opposed to an exhaustive, apparently ad
hoc, cataloging. Thus, the boiling point hypothesis, above, is able to
explain in a brief sentence countless observations of different boiling
points under different conditions which would not otherwise seem to
admit of any unifying principle. Similarly, Newton's formula states a
single law which is capable of explaining both celestial and terres-
trial mechanics. Because these hypotheses are, at once, simple and
very descriptive, they recommend themselves as especially plausible.
The problem with this view of simplicity, as Quine points out, is
that it contains a very strong subjective element; for what makes a
hypothesis brief, unified and coherent, and hence plausible, is largely
a function of our language and how we catalog and structure our
experience. Why then, Quine asks, "should the subjectively simpler
of two hypotheses stand a better chance of predicting objective
events?"
'24
The answer is that it should not; that is, there is no reason to
expect hypotheses which are framed according to our subjective lin-
guistic and psychological limitations to entirely conform with the ob-
jective structure of nature. Nonetheless, simplicity of hypothesis re-
mains good strategy. To see why this is so, let us turn again to the







Figure 1.1: The boiling point of water increases proportionately
with air pressure.
24. Id. at 71-72 (emphasis added).
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1 G (M1 M2 ) 10
Figure 2.1: Any particle of matter in the universe attracts any
other with a force (F) which varies directly as the product of the
masses (G (M i M2 )) and inversely as the square of the distance
between them (R).
Assume that points X, Y and Z on each graph represent the
most extreme instances of actual measurements which deviate from
the simpler predictions of the first set of graphs, represented here by
the broken curves. In Figure 1.1, these points might represent water
drawn from various lakes, streams and ponds; in Figure 2.1, perhaps
masses containing magnetic ore are involved. The point is that the
more complex curves shown here, which result from taking account
of the new measurements, more closely approximate the objective
structure of nature than did their counterparts in the first set of
graphs. But note the price that is paid. First, because of their asym-
metrical complexity, the new graphs will not enable us to even
roughly predict future phenomena. Standing alone, of course, this
would not be a valid complaint, as we cannot ignore the facts to
maintain simplicity of theory. The more serious problem is that in
attempting to accommodate all the exceptions or aberrations, the
rule is totally obscured; it is no longer possible to isolate the excep-
tions to determine why they deviate. It is for this reason that sim-
plicity of hypothesis makes for sound theorizing, in spite of its built-
in subjectivity and consequent limitations. As Quine notes:
[We] are continually finding that [we] have to tomplicate . . .
theories to accommodate new data. At each stage, however,
when choosing a hypothesis subject to subsequent correction, it
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is still best to choose the simplest that is not yet excluded. This
strategy recommends itself on much the same grounds as conser-
vatism and modesty. The longer the leap, we reflected [in con-
nection with conservatism], the more and wilder ways of going
wrong. But likewise, the more complex the hypothesis, the more
and wilder ways of going wrong; for how can we tell which com-
plexities to adopt? Simplicity, like conservatism and modesty,
limits liability. Conservatism can be good strategy even though
one's present theory be ever so far from the truth, and simplicity
can be good strategy even though the world be ever so compli-
cated. Our steps toward the complicated truth can usually be
laid out most dependably if the simplest hypothesis that is still
tenable is chosen at each step. It has even been argued that this
policy will lead us at least asymptotically toward a theory that is
true.2
5
To say that the simplest available hypotheses should be adopted,
however, is not to say that we may ignore those phenomena that they
fail to predict. Rather, we tentatively define the problem away by
stating the hypotheses more precisely. To continue with the preced-
ing examples, consider the effect which some minor revisions in the
two hypotheses will have on their respective graphs.






Figure 1.2: The boiling point of water which is free from impuri-
ties increases proportionately with air pressure.
R2  F = G (M M2)R2t0o ',
1 G (M1 M 2 ) 10
Figure 2.2: Other things being equal, any particle of matter in the
universe attracts any other with a force (F) which varies directly as
the product of the masses (G (M1 M2 )) and inversely as the square
of the distance between them (R).
Not only have we preserved the hypotheses, a point in our favor on
conservatism grounds alone, but, and more significant overall, we
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have isolated the exceptions for further study as to why the hypothe-
ses failed to predict them, an advantage we would not have enjoyed
had we opted for more complex hypotheses at the outset.
It must be conceded that simplicity is not as easy to recognize
or comply with in non-scientific contexts, such as textual interpreta-
tion, where theories cannot be plotted as curves on a graph. None-
theless, upon some reflection it becomes clear that as more and more
exceptions, qualifications and multiple standards are imposed on our
theories, for example, of equality and property, they cease to resem-
ble theories at all, and become more like ad hoc catalogings of un-
proven "axioms" which evince no unifying principles. Consequently,
as with the hypotheses considered above, the exceptions become
blurred with the rules, so that not only prediction, but also principled
accommodation of novel cases, becomes impossible. While negative
illustrations of simplicity are legion in constitutional law, the only
significant positive example which immediately comes to mind is




The virtue of modesty is in large part coextensive with simplic-
ity and conservatism. Hypotheses which are brief and unified, and
which conflict with few or no prior beliefs, tend to be modest as well.
Modesty becomes an independent concern only in those cases where
a hypothesis, while in full conformity with prior beliefs, is yet highly
extraordinary. The following statements are examples of such im-
modest hypotheses: "The sun will nova tomorrow;" "Christopher
Marlowe wrote all of Shakespeare's plays 'from the grave;' " "Aus-
26. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, (1972), wherein
Justice Marshall, in dissent, stated as follows:
The majority is, of course, correct when it suggests that the process of de-
termining which interests are fundamental is a difficult one. But I do not think
the problem is insurmountable. And I certainly do not accept the view that the
process need necessarily degenerate into an unprincipled, subjective "picking-
and-choosing" between various interests or that it must involve this court in cre-
ating "substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal pro-
tection of the laws,".... Although not all fundamental interests are constitu-
tionally guaranteed, the determination of which interests are fundamental should
be firmly rooted in the text of the Constitution. The task in every case should be
to determine the extent to which constitutionally guaranteed rights are depen-
dent on interests not mentioned in the Constitution. As the nexus between the
specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer,
the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of judi-
cial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis
must be adjusted accordingly.
Id. at 102-103. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tralopiths still roam the savanna;" and "Charlemagne never aspired
to Emperor."
Examples of immodest hypotheses in law are those cases and
doctrines which are said to be "cut from whole cloth." One such
doctrine is that of "Our Federalism" which the Supreme Court es-
tablished in Younger v. Harris,27 when it held that, in the absence of
very narrow exceptions, federal courts could not enjoin state criminal
prosecutions which threatened constitutional rights. Because
Younger involved an action to enjoin an ongoing state prosecution,
whereas its predecessors had all involved actions to enjoin future
state prosecutions, 8 the Court could have distinguished the case on
that ground alone and achieved the same result of prohibiting the
injunction. Instead, in a totally unnecessary and highly immodest
move, it announced the doctrine of "Our Federalism" as the grounds
for its decision, and thereby spawned at least a dozen cases whose
holdings bear no relation whatsoever to the central concern of
Younger itself.2 9
What the Younger case and the other examples above have in
common is that while they do not specifically contradict any prior
beliefs, neither are they implied or in any way logically necessitated
by them. If we again invoke Quine's metaphor of a web of belief,
immodest hypotheses may be visualized as points lying off the plane
of the web. They neither imply, nor are implied by, any segment of
the concatenation of beliefs and data - in short, they are irrelevant.
The price of incorporating such irrelevant hypotheses into our web is
that in doing so we necessarily incorporate all their likewise irrele-
vant implications and thus needlessly (and hopelessly) complicate
our theory, as the Younger line of cases demonstrates.
27. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
28. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Douglas v. City of Jeannette,
319 U.S. 157 (1943); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926); Ex Pane Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908).
29. The post-Younger decisions have invoked "Our Federalism" to deny injunctive relief
against enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional state laws in purely civil cases in which no
state judicial officer is even involved. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (no
federal injunction against enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional state attachment law);
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (no federal injunction against state's allegedly unconstitu-
tional statutory contempt procedures in purely private civil action); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362 (1976) (no federal injunction against allegedly unconstitutional disciplinary proceeding
brought against plaintiff by fellow police officers, notwithstanding that plaintiff asserted a sec-
tion 1983 claim, that no state judicial proceeding was pending or threatened, and that the
decision effectively rendered a police administrative board the ultimate arbiter of plaintiff's
federal constitutional rights); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (federal injunc-
tion may not issue against state prosecution under allegedly unconstitutional nuisance laws
providing for seizure of personal property used in connection with exhibition of obscene films).
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Modesty, like the other virtues, admits of degrees. Hence, while
some hypotheses, such as "Our Federalism" and the nova example,
are easily identifiable as immodest, other cases are not so clear. A
good example of the latter sort of case is the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Goldberg v. Kelly,30 wherein it held that statutory entitle-
ments to welfare benefits were sufficiently akin to "property" to re-
quire procedural due process as a precondition to their termination.
In support of its position, the Court, in a footnote, stated:
It may be realistic to regard welfare entitlements as more
like "property" than a "gratuity." Much of the existing wealth
in this country takes the form of rights that do not fall within
traditional common-law concepts of property. It has been aptly
noted that
"[slociety today is built around entitlement. The automo-
bile dealer has his franchise, the doctor and lawyer their profes-
sional licenses, the worker his union membership, contract, and
pension rights, the executive his contract and stock options; all
are devices to aid security and independence. Many of the most
important of these entitlements now flow from government: sub-
sidies to farmers and businessmen, routes for airlines and chan-
nels for television stations; long term contracts for defense, space
and education; social security pensions for individuals. Such
sources of security, whether private or public, are no longer re-
garded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they are essen-
tials, fully deserved, and in no sense a form of charity. It is only
the poor whose entitlements, although recognized by public pol-
icy, have not been effectively enforced."'"
Whether this theory of entitlement as property should count as mod-
est or immodest is open to question. In favor of modesty, it is noted
that the Court limited its holding to entitlements which impacted
important private interests such as the public assistance benefits at
issue, and explicitly excluded such peripheral entitlements as SEC
registration exemptions.3 2 On the other hand, Justice Black, in dis-
sent, advanced several arguments upon which a contrary result could
arguably be based. 83
Fortunately, a determination as to the reasonableness of hypoth-
eses in such unclear cases as Goldberg need not be based solely on
30. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
3 I. Id. at 262 n.8 (quoting Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965)).
32. Id. at 262-63 and n.10.
33. Id. at 272-79.
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grounds of modesty, conservatism or simplicity. These virtues, taken
together, help to ensure cautious theory-formation. As important as
caution is to any theoretical enterprise, however, it represents only
half the equation. When new data must be accounted for, or novel
cases decided, the foregoing virtues must give way, at least in part,
to generality.
D. Generality
A corollary to the rule of conservatism, that a good hypothesis
must sacrifice as little of the evidentiary support for our prior beliefs
as possible, is the rule of generality, which holds that such a hypoth-
esis must also be able to account for the entire complement of data
and beliefs which are not so sacrificed. For to the extent that a hy-
pothesis ignores relevant, available data, it runs the risk of inadver-
tently conflicting with the beliefs which that data implies and of run-
ning afoul of the virtue of conservatism. The importance of this point
may be illustrated by comparing the Supreme Court's decisions in
Plessy v. Ferguson" and Brown v. Board of Education.5
When the Court in Plessy framed the hypothesis that "separate
but equal" satisfied the concept of equality set forth in the four-
teenth amendment, it was operating in an intellectual milieu in
which there presumably was little, if any, available data from which
a belief contrary to this proposition could be derived. Since the
Plessy hypothesis was thus able to account for whatever data was
available as of 1896, it could claim to be general, and hence princi-
pled, even though it turned out later to be objectively incorrect. In
contrast, the Court in Brown had before it a wealth of data 6 which
indicated that segregation had pernicious effects on blacks, and
hence was inconsistent with the concept of equality. To retain the
Plessy hypothesis under such circumstances would not only fail to
satisfy the virtue of generality, by failing to account for relevant,
available data, but would also run afoul of the virtue of conserva-
tism, in that it would require the wholesale rejection of all the beliefs
that the new data on segregation implied.
Moreover, upon reflection, the originalist argument, that we
ascribe too much of our values to the Framers when we interpret
equality to mean anything more than "separate but equal," is illogi-
cal. In light of the evidence that segregation is psychologically and
34. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
35. 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
36. See id. at 489 n.4, 494-95 n.1l.
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socially more disadvantageous to blacks than it is to whites, it is
clear that it represents an instance of "inequality" in that term's
strictest, almost tautologous, dictionary definition. Hence, no matter
what concept of equality we ascribe to the Framers, if-we wish, as
the originalists seem to, to hold that this concept could be satisfied
by segregation in light of the current evidence, we would have to be
prepared to say that their concept could as well be satisfied by the
proposition that two plus two equals five.
The idea that generality is a prerequisite to principled explana-
tion did not, of course, originate with Quine. As Professor Wechsler
explained:
[T]he main constituent of the judicial process is precisely
that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to
every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and
reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved.
To be sure, the courts decide, or should decide, only the case
they have before them. But must they not decide on grounds of
adequate neutrality and generality, tested not only by the in-
stant application but by others that the principles imply? Is it
not the very essence of judicial method to insist upon attending
to such other cases, preferably those involving an opposing inter-
est, in evaluating any principle avowed?
A principled decision . . is one that rests on reasons with
respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their general-
ity and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is
involved.3
7
In order to be sufficiently general, however, a decision must con-
sider not only other foreseeable applications of the rule it states, but
all other relevant and available data as well. Thus, Professor Brest,
in pointing out that original intent theory requires the rejection of
much of the present body of constitutional law, notes that no theory
can be sound that fails to account for so much of the data that it is
called upon to explain. 8 Hence, a constitutional theory that fails to
account for such facts as statutory entitlements to welfare benefits,
or wiretapping by the government, or the psycho-sociological impact
of segregation on blacks as compared to whites, is unwarrantedly un-
derdescriptive. Theories which are maintainable only at the expense
37. PERRY, supra note 15, at 26 (quoting Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Con-
stitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1959)).
38. Brest, The Misconceived Quest or the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204,
223-31 (1980).
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of ignoring the facts are simply bad theories.
As Quine notes, when new data are observed which cannot be
explained by existing theories, conservatism and modesty must give
way to generality. When this occurs in science, scientific revolution
ensues, as it did when Einstein's theory of relativity cut through ear-
lier physical theories, including Newton's, which were unable to ex-
plain why the earth failed to travel through the legendary ether at
predicted speeds.3 9 When similarly unexplainable cases arise in a
constitutional context, generality likewise demands that new theories
be generated to account for them, if the Constitution is to remain
viable as a Rule over time.
E. Refutability
Retaining a hypothesis in the face of much conflicting data has
two major consequences. First, any beliefs and subsequent hypothe-
ses which are implied by the new data must be ignored. Second, a
series of false distinctions must be made in the form of ad hoc hy-
potheses in order to "explain" the discrepancies and retain the hy-
pothesis. In the extreme case, to hold a hypothesis totally irrefutable
requires the complete abandonment of conservatism and generality,
in that all the prior beliefs and new observations which may combine
to contribute to the refutation of the hypothesis must simply be ig-
nored. As Quine notes, in order for a hypothesis to be refutable,
"some imaginable event, recognizable if it occurs, must suffice to re-
fute the hypothesis. Otherwise, the hypothesis predicts nothing, is
confirmed by nothing, and confers upon us no earthly good beyond
perhaps a mistaken piece of mind.
' '40
The reason that irrefutable hypotheses are incapable of predic-
tion or self-confirmation is that whenever an event occurs that the
hypothesis failed to predict, an ad hoc hypothesis may always be
introduced to retain the original one. Astrology is a prime example:
Astrologers can so hedge their predictions that they are devoid
of genuine content. We may be told that a person will "tend to
be creative" or "tend to be outgoing," where the evasiveness of a
verb and the fuzziness of adjectives serve to insulate the claim
from repudiation. But even if a prediction should be regarded as
a failure, astrological devotees can go on believing that the stars
rule our destinies; for there is always some item of information,
perhaps as to a planet's location at a long gone time, that may
39. QUINE, supra note 13, at 74-75.
40. Id. at 79.
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be alleged to have been overlooked. Conflict with other beliefs
thus need not arise.
41
An example of an irrefutable hypothesis in law is furnished by
the Younger line of cases, considered above in connection with mod-
esty. In Younger,"' the doctrine of "Our Federalism" was justified
largely on the basis that an ongoing state criminal proceeding was
sought to be enjoined. Because criminal prosecutions are so much at
the core of a state's function as an independent sovereignty, it was
argued that it was especially important, in order to preserve "Our
Federalism," that federal courts not interfere in such cases.43 Soon
after Younger, however, the doctrine was applied in an obscenity
case on the ground that such cases were "quasi-criminal.""" The doc-
trine was subsequently applied in cases which decreasingly resem-
bled the stated paradigm of the state criminal prosecution, with a
false distinction or qualification introduced at each step, until the
doctrine was finally applied in purely civil proceedings.45 Thus, by
introducing an ad hoc hypothesis in every instance which failed to
resemble sufficiently the paradigm of the original hypothesis, the
Court rendered the latter irrefutable. As a result, it is no longer pos-
sible to predict in which cases "Our Federalism" will be applied. As
a hypothesis, it is worthless.
The alternative to rendering a hypothesis irrefutable is, of
course, to sacrifice whatever beliefs are necessary in order to accom-
modate whatever data the hypothesis failed to predict. Thus, assume
that oui original hypothesis is that water always boils at 100 degrees
centigrade, and that this hypothesis is based on observing boiling
points somewhere near sea level. If we then go into the mountains
and discover that our hypothesis fails to hold true there, we have two
options. First, we can render our hypothesis irrefutable by introduc-
ing some ad hoc hypothesis to "explain" the discrepancy. We could
say, for example, that the spirits of the mountains are angered and
are trying to taunt us by making water boil at a lower temperature.
Alternatively, we can refute the hypothesis and revise it so as to do
minimal damage to our overall web of belief, all the time being
mindful of the virtues of conservatism, generality, simplicity and
modesty. We would then proceed by first hypothesizing that water
41. Id. at 80.
42. 401 U.S. 37 (1970).
43. Id. at 45.
44. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
45. See supra, note 29 and accompanying text.
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always boils at 100 degrees centigrade and noting that this observa-
tion was made somewhere near sea level. Subsequently, when we ob-
serve that water boils at a lower temperature in the mountains, we
refute our hypothesis that it always boils at 100 degrees centigrade.
Being mindful of conservatism, however, we are loath to jettison in
its entirety our earlier hypothesis which seemed to indicate that
water boiled at some one constant temperature. Hence, having re-
corded all the circumstances surrounding our first observation, we
attempt to isolate the relevant differences, and conclude that water
boils at a lower temperature in the mountains than it does at sea
level. At this point, it is only a matter of time and effort before we
arrive at the truth.
The point, for purposes of constitutional interpretation, is simply
that when a theory is made to bear too many ad hoc exceptions,
qualifications, and three and four-prong tests, it approaches irrefuta-
bility and consequently becomes useless as a means of predicting like
future cases or accommodating novel ones in a principled fashion.
III. The "General/Particular" and "Concept/Conception" Theo-
ries Reconsidered
A. The General/Particular Theory
This theory, or metatheory, would have the interpreter treat the
morally or politically-oriented provisions of the text such as freedom
of speech, assembly and religion, as instances, or particularized ex-
pressions, of a single moral or political theory which is embedded in
the Constitution as a whole. Accordingly, interpretation under this
theory involves using the particularized textual provisions as building
blocks, or as steps in a ladder," from which to construct a general
constitutional theory. Once the general theory is so constructed, the
interpreter can apply it to future cases and derive particular rights
from it which are not explicitly stated in the text. Because this the-
ory claims its origin in the text, and yet is not strictly limited
thereto, it ostensibly avoids both the excesses of basic value theories
and the limitations of strict interpretivist theories. ' A good example
of its application is Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. Connecti-
46. Interestingly, this account precisely mirrors Plato's description of the ascent from
opinion (pistis) regarding particulars to complete (including moral) knowledge (noesis) of the
Forms and ultimately The Good, by means of the Dialectic. See PLATO, REPUBLIC *509d-
51 Id.
47. This summation of the general/particular theory is paraphrased from Schauer,
supra note 3, at 814-16.
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1987
cut,' 8 wherein he derived an unstated "penumbral" right of privacy
from the first amendment.
As noted at the outset of this paper, one of the criticisms of the
general/particular approach to interpretation is that it reintroduces
the very value-injection it seeks to avoid, in that the selection of par-
ticulars from which the general theory is to be derived will to some
degree be informed by the theoretical predispositions of the inter-
preter. This criticism is expressed by Professor Schauer as follows:
The process of selecting particulars is not and cannot be value-
neutral. Textually explicit particulars are analogous to obser-
vations from which we construct a theory, and we cannot lightly
ignore the extent to which such observations are controlled by
theory. The instances are not just there waiting for us to build a
theory around them. We have to select the particulars to use,
and this selection process contains implicit judgments of value
and importance.49
The problem with this criticism, aside from the fact that total
value-neutrality is neither possible, necessary, nor even desirable in
constitutional interpretation,50 is that it assumes at best negligence,
and at worst intellectual dishonesty, on the interpreter's part. Specif-
ically, Schauer seems to want to argue that because of the possibil-
ity that the interpreter will ignore one provision in preference to an-
other in order to preserve whatever theoretical predispositions he
brings to the interpretive process, any theories generated under the
general/particular model must be invalidated as not value-neutral.
Schauer might as well say that we cannot engage in scientific theo-
rizing because of the possibility that the scientific observer will look
the other way when he observes that water repeatedly boils at less
than 100 degrees centigrade in the mountains in order that he may
preserve his theory, based on his observations of boiling water at sea
level, that it never boils at less than 100 degrees centigrade. In other
words, Schauer assumes that both the interpreter and scientific ob-
server will ignore the dictates of responsible belief-formation (specifi-
cally, the virtues of conservatism and generality, noted above) in or-
der to preserve whatever beliefs they bring to their respective tasks.
This is a rash assumption indeed.
That jurists, contrary to Schauer's skepticism, are capable of a
good deal of neutrality in ordering and accommodating apparently
48. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
49. Schauer, supra note 3, at 818 (emphasis added).
50. PERRY, supra note 15, at 26-27.
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conflicting constitutional values, is evidenced by Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins.5" In that case, the
Court held that a California Supreme Court decision which con-
strued that state's constitution as permitting individuals to exercise
free speech and petition rights on private property did not violate the
property owner's property rights under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments or his free speech rights under the first and fourteenth
amendments. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist stated:
There is . . . little merit to appellants' argument that they
have been denied their property without due process of law. In
Nebbia v. New York, this Court stated:
[N]either property rights nor contract rights are
absolute . . . . Equally fundamental with the private
right is that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest ....
" [T]he guaranty of due process, as has often been held,
demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the objective sought to be attained."
Appellants have failed to provide sufficient justification for
concluding that this test is not satisfied by the State's asserted
interest in promoting more expansive rights of free speech and
petition than conferred by the Federal Constitution. 52
While it is true that the relative value-neutrality exhibited by
the Court in Pruneyard is not always the case, the Pruneyard opin-
ion at least demonstrates that such relative neutrality is possible and,
hence, that Schauer's assumptions to the contrary are insufficient
grounds for discrediting the general/particular theory.
B. The Concept/Conception Theory
This theory, closely related to the general/particular theory,
holds that constitutional provisions enacted broad concepts, rather
than narrow conceptions. Thus, for example, while the Framers of
the fourteenth amendment may have had a conception of equality
which was consistent with "separate but equal," they yet enacted
something more general which they knew would develop in ways not
necessarily contemplated by their original conception.53 Hence,
51. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
52. Id. at 84-85 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
53. See Dworkin., The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 476, 494-95 (1981).
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under this theory, constitutional provisions which embody concepts,
such as equality and speech, as opposed to mere conceptions, such as
"separate but equal," not only license, but in fact demand, non-inter-
pretivist approaches.
As noted above, the most serious criticism of this theory is that
it invites the interpreter to inject his personal values into the analysis
in selecting which level of generality the broad concepts are to be
stated at. If he states them at a sufficiently high level of generality,
he can then reinstantiate particular rights or conceptions to which,
the argument goes, the Framers might not have assented. Professor
Tushnet states the objection as follows:
The . . . objection rests on a frontal attack on the proposed dis-
tinction between concepts and conceptions, a distinction that re-
flects a general problem in constitutional theory. Frequently an
analysis turns completely on the level of generality at which
some feature of the issue under analysis is described. But the
choice of that level must be made on some basis external to the
analysis. For example, why describe the concept of equality on a
level of generality so high that it obliterates the specific inten-
tion to permit segregation? After all, the concept is - at least
in part - built up from particular experiences of what is seen as
equal treatment; it is to that extent derived from conceptions of
equality.5 1
If this criticism is merely directed against the claim that the
concept/conception theory truly reflects Framers' intent, it is a valid
one, though not impossible to argue with. If, on the other hand, the
criticism means to say that Dworkin's theory allows undue license to
be taken in interpreting the Constitution, it seems illogical.
The fact that a concept may have been derived from concep-
tions of equality, for example, which were contemporary to the
Framers, cannot be held to chain that concept to those conceptions.
Just as the Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson was ob-
jective but incorrect, so can it be said that the Framers of the four-
teenth amendment had a conception of equality that was objective
but incorrect. This is so because the tools (of social sciences, etc.) to
see that the conceptions were incorrect were not available to the
Framers of the fourteenth amendment or to the Justices in Plessy, as
they are available today. But to argue that for this reason we cannot
generalize - or extrapolate - and return to an uncontroversial con-
cept of equality to rebuild our web from that point outward based on
54. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 791.
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all the data which is currently available to us, is to throw out the
baby with the bath water. It is tantamount to saying that because an
astronomer's conception of the sun revolving around the earth (no
one would argue that this observation was not objective) turned out,
upon the receipt of more data, to be incorrect, we must then discard
the concept (derived from that conception) of an interdependent sys-
tem of planets whose movements affected, and were affected by,
each other.
For this reason, one cannot responsibly argue that because the
conception from which a concept such as equality is derived turns
out to be incorrect, one is then obliged to throw out the concept as
well. The strength of a hypothesis, what makes it capable of predic-
tion and self-confirmation, is refutability. As noted above, however,
this does not mean that when data comes in which contradicts the
hypothesis, one should automatically throw out the hypothesis.
Rather, we adjust, revise, and fine-tune the hypothesis as conserva-
tively as possible in order to account for the contradictory data. It is
only when the contradictory data is so overwhelming that the cost of
retaining the hypothesis exceeds the cost of jettisoning it (that is,
when retaining the hypothesis entails the sacrifice of a greater num-
ber of beliefs than discarding it does), that one is obligated to dis-
card the hypothesis. As seen above in connection with refutability,
the price of not discarding a hypothesis under such circumstances is
the proliferation of ultimately so many ad hoc hypotheses to "ex-
plain" the discrepancies that the original hypothesis is rendered to-
tally incapable of predicting or explaining events. This would be pre-
cisely the consequence of chaining ourselves to the Framers'
conceptions, if indeed it is by any means possible to divine what
those conceptions were.
To return to equality, the social sciences, in particular, and a
heightened sensitivity to human relations in general, have shown us
that segregation has imposed greater disadvantages on blacks than it
has on whites (and we must be able to say that some degree of ob-
jectivity is possible in the social sciences and moral philosophy). Be-
cause segregation is a form of inequality, even on the term's least
controversial, dictionary definition, we are justified, in adherence to
the concept of equality embodied in the fourteenth amendment, in
condemning it. This is so because no matter what concept the Fram-
ers had of equality, it is uncontroversial that it embodied the pro-
position that two and two make four. It is true that they may have
thought that segregation was consistent with that concept - indeed,
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the concept may even have been derived from a conception of "sepa-
rate but equal." The fact that some one given conception was incor-
rect, however, is far from justification for discarding the concept de-
rived from it. Rather, just as we do in science, we retain the concept
(for example, that water boils at a given temperature) even though
the conceptions from which the concept was derived (for example,
the conception that water always boils at 100 degrees centigrade)
turn out to be incorrect.
C. The Underdeterminativeness Argument
The third serious criticism, which is directed at both the gen-
eral/particular and the concept/conception theories, is that they are
underdeterminative. In essence, this criticism argues that since any
number of theories may be generated from, and be equally consistent
with, the same set of particulars, and yet yield different results for
future cases, all such theories are underdeterminative, and cannot
claim to be derived from the text. Professor Schauer sets forth this
criticism in full as follows:
[A]ny general/particular theory mistakenly assumes that
one general principle (or theory) can be uniquely, or at least
most correctly, derived from a set of particulars, or instances.
This assumption, however, ignores the extent to which any the-
ory - scientific, moral, or interpretive - is underdetermined by
any number of specific instances or observations. Theory is un-
derdetermined in this sense because any number of empirical
observations, or specific instances, can generate and be consis-
tent with a large and perhaps infinite number of explanatory
theories. Moreover, each such explanatory theory will yield dif-
ferent predictions or results for future cases. For example, a
given set of symptoms can be consistent with a number of differ-
ent medical diagnoses, and to that extent the diagnosis is un-
derdetermined by the observation of symptoms. Similarly, sev-
eral different theories about the formation of the solar system
might be equally consistent with our observations about the so-
lar system. The principle of underdetermination of theory ap-
plies to a wide range of activities, and it has been frequently
discussed in reference to the philosophy of science, to literary
criticism, to historical explanation, and so forth. In each of these
disciplines, theory acquires a different role, but the point re-
mains the same: specific examples, instances, observations, or
events can produce more than one theory equally consistent with
those examples, instances, observations, or events.
We see the same phenomenon in constitutional theorizing
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because a large number of different overarching theories would
be consistent with the specific moral or political principles speci-
fied in the text. We may have good reasons to choose one theory
rather than another, just as a doctor may have good reasons to
choose one medical diagnosis over another that is equally consis-
tent with the same symptoms. But the constitutional text does
not determine the choice among theories equally consistent with
it, and thus the argument that the theory is generated by the
Constitution is seen to be a fake. Certainly we can require that
the particular theory fit all of the textualized particulars as a
necessary condition of its validity. But if this is taken to be a
sufficient condition, then there is little limit on the extent to
which quite different theories can find their source in the Consti-
tution. If that is so, the text does not control the result in future
cases and does not affect our decision of which competing coher-
ent theory to accept. This does not mean that judges should be
forbidden to construct moral or political theories, but it does de-
feat the claim that the theory so constructed is either mandated
by or derived from the text. 5
First, it is noted that the fact that a theory is underdetermina-
tive does not make it unprincipled or subjective. It is just not a valid
criticism of a theory (as it is with a putative "law" of physics, for
example) to say that it turns out to be incorrect.
Second, and more important, as regards the authoritativeness
argument, while Schauer's criticism may well defeat the claim that
the results reached under the general/particular group of theories
are mandated by the text, it does not defeat the claim that they are
derived from the text. While Professor Schauer cites to some of
Quine's work in theories of meaning, he appears to have ignored
Quine's epistemology. When we speak of generating theories of con-
stitutional interpretation, we are not talking about, and do not want
to be talking about, irrefutable laws of interpretation. The latter
serve no purpose, either in science or in law, because they predict
nothing. Some hypotheses are good, some are bad; if they become
exceedingly general (like astrology or "Our Federalism"), they be-
come commensurately less answerable to any one particular observa-
tion or case. For this reason, we fine-tune a hypothesis to make it
accommodate, and remain consistent with, as many new observations
and data as possible, thus maintaining an optimum level of general-
ity and predictability. The strength of this approach is that when any
55. Schauer, supra note 3, at 816-18.
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one given theory cannot be made to bear the weight of explanation
of many new data without making great sacrifices in generality, sim-
plicity, or refutability, it is discarded in favor of a hypothesis that
can bear the weight.
In sum, we want our theory to be underdeterminative, because
that is precisely what makes it refutable. It must be the case that
some future phenomenon will just not (try as we might) be explaina-
ble by the theory; then we see that the theory must be discarded in
favor of a better one. To say that there was only one theory that was
consistent with all particulars would make that theory irrefutable,
like astrology or the "Our Federalism" cases, discussed above. Such
a theory would be one hundred percent determinative and hence
would be incapable of further development to make it answer to fu-
ture counter-examples. In other words, a theory that "explains" eve-
rything, explains nothing.
Conclusion
If the Constitution is to remain the supreme Rule by which our
society is governed, it must remain capable of accommodating
change. In order to do so, however, it must be interpreted and the
interpretation must be principled and objective. As was noted in the
quotation from Schauer, above, regarding the general/particular
theories, this sort of objectivity is difficult even in scientific observa-
tion, let alone in interpreting the meaning of the Constitution's
vague language so as to resolve complicated contemporary disputes
in a principled manner. For this reason, it is hoped that by referring
the interpreter to a set of rules, such as Quine's, regarding what we
may say we know and how we may most legitimately use what we
know, we will provide more realistic constraints on interpretation
than we do by handing the interpreter a 200-year old document and
inviting him to use it as a blank check for the insertion of his per-
sonal values by asking him what it "means."
